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EMPLOYMENT LAW-TITLE VII AND THE ANTI-RETALIATION
PROVISION-BEYOND EMPLOYMENT AND THE WORKPLACE: THE UNITED
STATES SUPREME COURT RESOLVES THE SPLIT AND SHIFTS THE BALANCE.
Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Co. v. White, 126 S. Ct. 2405 (2006).
I. INTRODUCTION
Employers have always known that it is foolish to take action against
an employee following protected activity, and now, after the Supreme
Court's decision in Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. White,'
"employers should proceed with even greater caution."2 In 2005, 29.5% of
all illegal discrimination claims filed with the Equal Employment Opportu-
nity Commission alleged retaliation.3 Prior to Burlington Northern, the
United States Courts of Appeals decided those retaliation claims on a case-
by-case basis because "'unfortunately [the forms of discrimination] are as
varied as the human imagination will permit."' 4 Courts struggled to define
the seriousness required of an employer's adverse action, and, as a result, a
split among the circuits developed.5
In its recent decision in Burlington Northern, the Supreme Court re-
solved the split among the federal circuit courts by extending Title VII's
anti-retaliation provision to retaliatory acts and harms that are unrelated to
employment or that occur outside of the workplace.6 The Court limited its
holding by concluding that Title VII prohibits only those employer actions
that would "dissuade a reasonable worker from making or supporting a
charge of discrimination."7 The Supreme Court's decision expanded the
definition of retaliatory conduct, undoubtedly shifting the balance in favor
of employees. The Court's decision will likely encourage more employees
to file retaliation claims and may even make it easier for employees' claims
to reach a jury; therefore, employers should think twice before taking any
disciplinary actions against an employee who has engaged in protected ac-
tivity.
1. 126 S. Ct. 2405 (2006).
2. Russell Adler, Employers, Beware: Supreme Court Decision Changes the Playing
Field, 234 THE LEGAL INTELLIGENCER 40, Aug. 29, 2006, available at WL 8/29/2006 TLI 5.
3. Michael Starr, Employment Law: Retaliation Reinvigorated, 28 THE NAT'L L.J. 50,
Aug. 14, 2006, available at WL 8/14/2006 NLJ 16, (Col. 1).
4. Marisa Williams & Rhonda Rhodes, Recent Developments in Retaliation Law and
Resulting Implications for the Federal Sector, 28 CoLo. LAW. 59, 60 (Jan. 1999) (quoting
Knox v. Indiana, 93 F.3d 1327, 1334 (7th Cir. 1996)).
5. Id.
6. Burlington Northern, 126 S. Ct. at 2416.
7. Id. at 2409.
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It should be noted that the Supreme Court's requirement that employ-
ers' actions be materially adverse under an objective standard does afford
some protection to employers. However, employers will have to wait to see
if the Court's limitations actually afford them any protection against the
increasing number of retaliation claims likely to be filed under the Court's
new standard.
This note examines the significance of the Supreme Court's decision in
Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. White to employers and
employees in the United States. The note first summarizes the facts behind
the Burlington Northern case and the procedural history that led it to the
Supreme Court Next, the note explores the pertinent statutory language and
the split among the federal circuits.9 The note then examines the Court's
analysis in its Burlington Northern decision.' ° The note concludes with a
discussion of the decision's implications for employees and employers and
the promises of the Court's new standard."
II. FACTS
Burlington Northern and Santa Fe Railway Company ("Burlington
Northern") hired Shelia White on June 23, 1997, as a track laborer at its
Yard in Memphis, Tennessee.' 2 The position required White to perform
physically demanding tasks, such as "maintaining and oiling railway
switches, and doing repairs."' 3 Before hiring White, Burlington Northern's
Human Resource Manager and the Tennessee Yard's roadmaster inter-
viewed White, and she assured them that she had experience operating a
forklift.' 4 After White's hire, a need arose to fill the stationary forklift posi-
tion at the Yard, and Marvin Brown, roadmaster of the Tennessee Yard,
assigned White to the position. 5
White complained that between July 2, 1997, and September 16, 1997,
Burlington Northern employees treated her differently because she was a
female, and her foreman twice made inappropriate comments.' 6 White's
immediate supervisor, Bill Joiner, did not have experience supervising a
woman and "admitted at trial that he treated White differently because of
8. See infra Part II.
9. See infra Part III.
10. See infra Part IV.
11. See infra Part V.
12. White v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. (White 1), 310 F.3d 443, 446-47 (6th
Cir. 2002).
13. Id. at 447.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
[Vol. 29
EMPLOYMENT LAW
her gender" and "that the Maintenance of Way department was not an ap-
propriate place for women to work."' 7 White alleged that Joiner "repeatedly
expressed this belief to her while she was working under his supervision."' 8
White reported these allegations to Joiner's supervisor, who, in turn, con-
tacted Cathy McGee, Burlington Northern's Human Resources Manager. 9
After McGee's investigation, she suspended Joiner for ten days without pay
and required that he attend a sexual harassment training session.2°
On the same day White's foreman received his suspension, Brown
reassigned White's forklift duties to a male employee because senior male
employees complained that Burlington Northern gave White preferential
treatment because of her gender.2' On cross examination, Brown testified
that the men's complaints were made before White's complaint of sexual
harassment but that he did not transfer her until after she reported her allega-
tions.22 White's new assignment as a standard track laborer provided her the
same pay and benefits as her forklift position, "but her new job was, by all
accounts, more arduous and 'dirtier' than the forklift position.'23
White filed a discrimination charge with the Equal Employment Op-
portunity Commission (EEOC) on October 10, 1997, claiming that her reas-
signment to standard track laborer constituted "unlawful gender-based dis-
crimination and retaliation for her having earlier complained about Joiner.,
24
White filed a second charge of discrimination with the EEOC on December
4, 1997, alleging retaliation. In her retaliation charge, White complained
that Brown constantly observed and monitored her and her daily activities.26
The EEOC mailed Brown notification of the second charge of discrimina-
tion and retaliation on December 8, 1997.27
Percey Sharkey, White's foreman, "removed White from service for
insubordination" on December 11, 1997.28 Sharkey testified at trial that after
he directed one of the other employees to accompany him and help with the
heavy lifting, White refused to ride in a different truck with another fore-
man. 9 White refused because she claimed that she had seniority over the
17. White v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. (White I), 364 F.3d 789, 792
(6th Cir. 2004).
18. Id.
19. White I, 310 F.3d at 447.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. White II, 364 F.3d at 792-93.
24. Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Co. v. White, 126 S. Ct. 2405, 2409 (2006).
25. White 1, 310 F.3d at 448.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
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employee directed to ride with Sharkey.3° After Marvin Brown reviewed
Sharkey's written description of the incident, Brown informed Sharkey that
White's conduct constituted insubordination.3' This decision to suspend
White was made seven days after she filed her second EEOC charge and
three days after the EEOC mailed Brown notification.
32
Subsequently, White filed a grievance for her suspension, and in re-
sponse to the grievance, Burlington Northern investigated the matter.3 On
January 16, 1998, Burlington Northern reinstated White to full service, after
concluding that her conduct did not constitute insubordination. 34 White re-
ceived all the backpay that she was entitled to during her thirty-seven-day
suspension, including overtime pay and benefits.35 After exhausting her ad-
ministrative remedies before the EEOC,36 White filed suit against Burlington
Northern, claiming unlawful gender discrimination in violation of 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2(a)(l) and unlawful retaliation in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
337
A. United States District Court for the Western District of Tennessee
In the United States District Court for the Western District of Tennes-
see, the jury returned a verdict in favor of White on her retaliation claim
against Burlington Northern and awarded her $43,500 in damages.38 The
jury found against White on her claims of sexual harassment and punitive
damages. 9
Burlington Northern argued in a motion for judgment as a matter of
law that White did not establish retaliation "because her changed job duties
and temporary suspension were not adverse employment actions within the
meaning of Title VII."40 Burlington Northern also claimed that White did
not show that its "asserted legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for trans-
ferring her was pretextual" and that "the temporal proximity of White's
EEOC charge and her suspension did not support an inference of retalia-
30. Id.
31. White l, 310 F.3d at 448.
32. White I, 364 F.3d at 794.
33. White 1, 310 F.3d at 448.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. White 11, 364 F.3d at 794.
37. White 1, 310 F.3d at 446.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
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tion."4 ' In ruling for White, the court found that White's evidence of her
reassignment sufficiently met the adverse employment action standard.42
The district court also found that White's thirty-seven-day suspension
constituted an adverse employment action, even though Burlington Northern
reversed its decision to suspend White and provided her with backpay.43 The
district court ruled that Burlington Northern's reliance on Dobbs- Weinstein
v. Vanderbilt University4 was misplaced because the employee in that case
was not immediately suspended and because that case involved a tenured
faculty member in an academic setting.4"
In considering Burlington Northern's claim that White failed to prove
that its legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for transferring her was pretextual,
the district court held that the "jurors received conflicting evidence that the
jury could properly resolve in White's favor.,4 6 The court further held that
White presented sufficient evidence to allow the jurors to determine that her
suspension was the result of her EEOC charge against Burlington North-
ern.
47
B. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, sitting as a
panel, considered whether Burlington Northern's actions were "sufficiently
adverse employment actions to sustain a cause of action under Title VII's
anti-retaliation provision, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a)." ' In reversing the deci-
sion of the district court, a divided Sixth Circuit panel held that White failed
to establish a prima facie case of retaliation because neither her lateral em-
ployment transfer nor her temporary suspension constituted sufficient ad-
verse employment action to support a Title VII retaliation claim.49
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. WhiteI, 310 F.3d at 446.
44. 185 F.3d 542 (6th Cir. 1999). The Sixth Circuit granted summary judgment in favor
of defendant Vanderbilt University because the plaintiff was unable to produce sufficient
evidence of an "adverse employment action cognizable under Title VII." Id. at 543, 545. The
plaintiff's evidence that the University's dean did not concur in the departmental decision to
promote and tenure the plaintiff did not rise to the level of adverse employment action be-
cause the University employed an internal grievance procedure. Id. at 545.
45. White 1, 310 F.3d at 446.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 445.
49. Id. at 445-46.
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1. Reassignment of the Forklift Responsibilities Issue
Burlington Northern argued that White did not suffer an adverse em-
ployment action because her reassignment from forklift duty to track laborer
constituted a non-actionable lateral employment transfer." Burlington
Northern also argued that White's reassignment did not materially disadvan-
tage her because she maintained her track laborer position throughout her
employment with the railroad, and "[she] never suffered a termination, a
demotion evidenced by a wage or salary decrease, a less distinguished job
title, a material loss of benefits, or significantly diminished material respon-
sibilities."'" White argued that the district court properly held that she pre-
sented sufficient evidence to show that her lateral transfer was an adverse
employment action.52 The court of appeals rejected White's argument, stat-
ing that one of White's explicit employment responsibilities included main-
taining the railroad tracks, and the fact that forklift duty was less physically
demanding than track maintenance work did not make her reassignment an
adverse employment action. 3
2. Suspension from Service Issue
Burlington Northern argued "that the district court erred when it found
that White's suspension constituted adverse employment action" because
Burlington Northern reinstated White to full service with back pay, includ-
ing overtime pay and benefits.5 4 The court of appeals rejected the district
court's and White's distinguishment of Dobbs-Weinstein from the present
case and concluded that White failed to establish a Title VII retaliation
claim.55 The court stated that the district court ignored the fact "that Burling-
ton Northern ultimately reversed White's suspension and reinstated her with
full back pay and overtime."56 The court concluded that White's failure to
show an adverse employment action precluded her from supporting a Title
VII claim.57 Therefore, the court reversed and remanded to the district court
to set aside the jury verdict.58
50. Id. at 446.
51. White1, 310F.3dat451.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 451-52.
55. Id. at 453,455.
56. Id. at 454.
57. White 1, 310 F.3d at 455.
58. Id.
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C. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, En Banc
After the divided Sixth Circuit panel reversed the district court's deci-
sion and held in favor of Burlington Northern on White's retaliation claims,
the full court of appeals heard the matter en banc and vacated the panel's
decision.59 The en banc court heard the case to address the meaning of "ad-
verse employment action" for purposes of a Title VII retaliation claim.60 In
affirming the decision of the district court, the Sixth Circuit en banc held
that a lateral job transfer and a thirty-seven-day suspension without pay,
notwithstanding the employee's reinstatement with back pay, constituted
adverse employment actions.6
The court of appeals first addressed the meaning of "adverse employ-
ment action" for purposes of a Title VII retaliation claim and then deter-
mined whether White's lateral job transfer and suspension rose to the level
of adverse employment actions.62 White and the EEOC, which filed an ami-
cus curiae brief on White's behalf, argued for the adoption of the adverse
employment action definition included in the EEOC Guidelines.63 The
EEOC interpreted "adverse employment action" as "any adverse treatment
that is based on a retaliatory motive and is reasonably likely to deter a
charging party or others from engaging in protected activity."64 The court
rejected this request and reaffirmed that it would continue to define the ad-
verse-employment-action element narrowly, requiring "a significant change
in employment status, such as hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassign-
ment with significantly different responsibilities, or a decision causing a
significant change in benefits.
65
The court of appeals applied its definition to the thirty-seven-day sus-
pension and held that suspending an employee without pay for a month was
not trivial and might violate Title VII if motivated by discriminatory intent. 66
The court next considered White's lateral job transfer and held that the deci-
sion to transfer White was an adverse employment action because the stan-
dard track laborer job was "more arduous and dirtier" than the forklift op-
erator position and because "the forklift operator position required more
qualifications, which is an indication of prestige. 67 Finally, the court agreed
59. Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Co. v. White, 126 S. Ct. 2405, 2410 (2006).
60. White II, 364 F.3d at 791 (internal quotations omitted).
61. Id.
62. See id. at 795-800.
63. Id. at 798.
64. Id. (quoting EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL § 8, 1 8008 (1998)) (internal quotations
omitted).
65. Id. at 798, 800 (citing Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 761 (1998)) (inter-
nal quotations omitted).
66. White II, 364 F.3d at 802.
67. Id. at 803 (internal quotations omitted).
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with the district court that there was sufficient evidence from which the jury
could determine that Burlington Northern's asserted legitimate, nondiscri-
minatory reasons for transferring White were pretextual.68
III. BACKGROUND
This section will first explore the language of the anti-discrimination
provision of Title VII, 69 the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting analysis for
intentional discrimination claims,7" and the damages available to a success-
ful plaintiff in an employment discrimination action.7 Next, it will examine
the anti-retaliation provision's language, the scant legislative history avail-
able,73 and the historical prima facie requirements of a retaliation claim.74
Finally, it will explore the three primary approaches circuits have used to
interpret the scope of the "adverse employment action" language contained
in the anti-retaliation provision.75
A. Pertinent Statutory Provisions
1. Anti-Discrimination Provision: What Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 Section 703(a), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) Is Meant To
Accomplish
a. The statute's purpose and scope
In response to the depressed employment status of the American black
community relative to other workers in the United States, Congress at-
tempted to attack the "root of the problem" by enacting Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964.76 Congress's central objective in enacting Title VII was
to improve minority employment statistics "by requiring employers to use
colorblind standards in their hiring and promoting decisions., 77 Title VII
effectively reached beyond black oppression and provided other groups,
68. Id. at 804.
69. See infra Part III.A. .a.
70. See infra Part HI.A. 1.b.
71. See infra Part III.A.l.c.
72. See infra Part III.A.2.a.
73. See infra Part III.A.2.b.
74. See infra Part III.A.2.c.
75. See infra Part III.B.
76. Developments in the Law-Employment Discrimination and Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 84 HARv. L. REv. 1109, 1113 (1971).
77. Id. at 1116.
[Vol. 29
EMPLOYMENT LAW
"whether defined in terms of race, religion, or national origin," powerful
standing for obtaining equality in the job market.78
Congress enacted section 703(a) of Title VII to provide the following:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer (1) to fail or
refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, condi-
tions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin; or (2) to limit, segregate, or classi-
fy his employees or applicants for employment in any way which would
deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or
otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such in-
dividual's race, color, religion, sex[,] or national origin. 79
Although the Act explicitly provides broad protection against employment
discrimination, Congress did include some limitations and exceptions to the
Act's coverage.80 For example, under Title VII, employers must "affect
commerce" and employ a minimum of fifteen employees for coverage.8'
Any "person" in an industry affecting commerce is included under Title VII,
meaning that an employer, a labor organization, or an employment agency
are among the "persons" covered. 2 In addition, Title VII preempts state law
if such law is inconsistent with federal anti-discrimination statutes.8
3
b. The McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green burden-shifting test
If an employer intentionally discriminates against an individual based
upon that individual's "race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or age," the
action is unlawful, absent a valid defense.84 Plaintiffs claiming an intentional
78. Id. at 1111.
79. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 703(a), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1994).
80. MARK A. RoTHsTEIN ET AL., EMPLOYMENT LAW § 3.2, at 88 (1994).
81. 1 MARK A. ROTHSTEIN ET AL., EMPLOYMENT LAW § 2.2, at 141 (3d ed. 2004) (inter-
nal quotations omitted); see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b). Legislative history shows that the
numerical restriction was a reflection of Congress's goal to not burden small businesses with
federal requirements. ROTHSTEIN ET AL., supra, § 2.3 at 159.
82. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(a)-(d) (1994).
83. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-7 (1994). This section states as follows:
Nothing in this subchapter shall be deemed to exempt or relieve any person from
any liability, duty, penalty, or punishment provided by any present or future law
of any State or political subdivision of a State, other than any such law which
purports to require or permit the doing of any act which would be an unlawful
employment practice under this subchapter.
Id.
84. 1 ROTHSTEIN ET AL., supra note 81, § 2.6, at 182-83. The defense of "bona fide
occupational qualification" allows employers to intentionally classify applicants or em-
ployees in narrow circumstances, such as is "reasonably necessary to the normal operation of
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violation of the Act must "establish that the defendant acted intentionally to
treat the plaintiff class or the individual plaintiff differently."85 When direct
evidence of intentional employment discrimination is unavailable, a plaintiff
may establish her case by presenting circumstantial evidence.86 In McDon-
nell Douglas, the Supreme Court first introduced the application of a three-
part paradigm to cases in which individuals allege employment discrimina-
tion using circumstantial evidence. 7 First, the employee must carry the ini-
tial burden of establishing a prima facie case of racial discrimination. 8 If the
employee is successful, the burden then shifts to the employer to articulate
some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employer's action. 89 The
employer's "articulation of a legitimate reason for the decision has the effect
of dispelling the inference of improper motivation created by the plaintiffs
proof."9° The third part of the paradigm allows the employee an opportunity
to introduce evidence to show that the employer's stated reason was, in fact,
pretextual. 9' The Supreme Court used this case to develop a general rule
"designed to bring order to a chaotic situation that had developed within the
lower courts." 92 The McDonnell-Douglas formula is applied to private, non-
class-action suits challenging employment discrimination.93
that particular business or enterprise." Id. § 2.18, at 273-74 (internal citations omitted). This
defense is limited to exclusion on the basis of gender, religion, and national origin, notably
omitting race. Id.
85. Id. § 2.21, at 293.
86. Id. § 2.8, at 197.
87. See 411 U.S. 792, 793-807 (1973). The employee, Green, alleged race discrimina-
tion and discrimination resulting from his attempts to protest alleged discriminatory practices.
Id. at 796. Green, a black man, "was laid off in the course of a general reduction in [his em-
ployer]'s work force." Id. at 794. Green actively protested against his employer's actions in
discharging him and against its general hiring practices. Id. After Green's participation in a
lock-in, the employer "publicly advertised for qualified mechanics, [Green]'s trade, and
[Green] promptly applied for re-employment." Id. at 796. The employer rejected Green for
employment, and Green filed a formal complaint with the EEOC, alleging that the employ-
er's refusal to rehire him was predicated on his race and protesting activities in violation of
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). Id.
88. Id. at 802. A plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of racial discrimination showing
the following:
(i) that [the plaintiff] belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that [the plaintiff] applied
and was qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking applicants; (iii)
that, despite his qualifications, [the plaintiff] was rejected; and (iv) that, after his
rejection, the position remained open[,] and the employer continued to seek ap-
plicants from persons of complainant's qualifications.
Id.
89. Id. Green's participation in unlawful conduct was the employer's reasonable basis
for its refusal to rehire Green. Id. at 803.
90. 1 ROTHSTEINETAL.,supra note 81, § 2.8, at 197.
91. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 804.
92. 1 LARSON, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION § 8.01[l], at 8-5 (2d ed. 2006).
93. Id. § 8.01[2], at 8-8.
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c. Damages
Congress did not intend for employment discrimination disputes to be
handled like other civil disputes, and therefore, it originally enacted Title
VII to not provide for compensatory or punitive damages. 94 Because the
Title VII remedies were equitable in nature, including hiring, reinstatement,
and back pay, such actions were tried without a jury.95 Congress extended
compensatory and punitive damages to plaintiffs in the Civil Rights Act of
1991, which allowed employees who prevailed in actions brought for inten-
tional discrimination to recover compensatory damages.96 The 1991 Act
further provided that '"if the complaining party demonstrates that the res-
pondent engaged in a discriminatory practice or discriminatory practices
with malice or with reckless indifference to the federally protected rights of
an aggrieved individual,"' plaintiffs can recover punitive damages against
non-governmental defendants.97
2. Anti-Retaliation Provision: What Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 Section 704(a), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3 (a) Is Meant
To Accomplish
a. Statutory language
In addition to prohibiting employment discrimination on the grounds of
race, sex, religion, or national origin, Title VII creates a remedy for retalia-
tory conduct under section 704(a), which provides that "it shall be an unlaw-
ful employment practice for an employer to discriminate against" an appli-
cant for employment or any employee opposing "any practice made an un-
lawful employment practice by [Title VII], or because he has made a charge,
testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceed-
ing, or hearing under [Title VII]." 98
94. 1 ROTHSTEIN ETAL., supra note 81, § 2.31, at 345.
95. Id. § 2.30, at 343.
96. Id. §2.31, at346.
97. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C.A. § 1981A).
98. Section 704(a), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (1982). Its full text states as follows:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate
against any of his employees or applicants for employment, for an employment
agency, or joint labor-management committee controlling apprenticeship or other
training or retraining, including on-the-job programs, to discriminate against any
individual, or for a labor organization to discriminate against any member the-
reof or applicant for membership, because he has opposed any practice made an
unlawful employment practice by this subchapter, or because he has made a
charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, pro-
ceeding, or hearing under this subchapter.
2007]
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b. Legislative history
Because a person claiming to be aggrieved by an alleged act of dis-
crimination must first file a complaint with the Equal Employment Oppor-
tunity Commission (EEOC) and await the results of an EEOC investiga-
tion,99 the drafters of Title VII must have realized the necessity of protecting
individuals against hardships during the "waiting period."'" Without some
punishment against retaliation, individuals would be reluctant to oppose
discriminatory practices, which would, ultimately, diminish Title VII's pur-
pose and effectiveness.'
Little more is known of Congress's intention behind the enactment of
section 704(a). No explanation of its meaning can be found in the committee
reports on the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Equal Employment Act of
1963, which later became Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, because such
reports simply repeat the language of the statute. 2 Furthermore, neither the
proceedings nor the floor debates reveal anything concerning Congress's
intended interpretation of section 704(a).103 Some indication of congression-
al intent can be found, however, in the following statement: "[Management]
prerogatives ... are to be left undisturbed to the greatest extent possible.
Internal affairs of employers ... must not be interfered with except to the
limited extent that correction is required in discrimination practices."'
' 04
Courts have attempted to discover the legislative intent behind the
enactment of section 704(a) but have had little success. 5 In Hochstadt v.
Id.
99. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (1994). The process is summarized as follows: A person claim-
ing to be aggrieved by his or her employer's alleged unlawful employment practices may file
a charge with the EEOC within 180 days after the alleged unlawful employment practice
occurred. Id. The EEOC serves notice of the charge on the employer within ten days and
conducts an investigation. Id. If, after the investigation, the EEOC determines that there is not
reasonable cause to support the charge, dismisses the charge, and promptly notifies the em-
ployer and the person claiming to be aggrieved, who may then bring a private action within
ninety days. Id. If the EEOC does find reasonable cause, it first attempts to eliminate any
such alleged unlawful employment practice by informal methods. Id. If those methods fail,
the EEOC may bring a civil suit against the employer in district court. Id.
100. Delbert L. Spurlock, Proscribing Retaliation Under Title VII, 8 IND. L. REv. 453,
459(1975).
101. Id.
102. Edward C. Walterscheid, A Question of Retaliation: Opposition Conduct as Pro-
tected Expression Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 29 B.C. L. REv. 391, 393
(1988); see also H.R. Rep. No. 914, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 7, at 27-28, as reprinted in
1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2391, 2403.
103. Walterscheid, supra note 102, at 393.
104. Id. (citing Additional Views on H.R. 7152, 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2487, 2516) (internal
quotation omitted).
105. Id. at 394.
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Worcester Foundation for Experimental Biology,"°6 the First Circuit stated
that the legislative history is unclear as to the scope of Congress's intent to
immunize employee activity. 7 Furthermore, the Court determined that the
unrevealing proceedings and floor debates over Title VII would leave the
courts to "develop their own interpretation of protected opposition."' 08 In
Green v. McDonnell Douglas Corp.,'9 the Eighth Circuit stated that the lack
of legislative history provided no guidance as to the scope of section
704(a)." °
The EEOC Compliance Manual sets forth the EEOC's position as to
Congress's intended scope of section 704(a)."' The EEOC opines that the
provision is intended to provide "exceptionally broad protection" for those
who protest discriminatory employment practices." 2 If an individual's asser-
tion of discrimination under section 703(a) could "result in retaliatory action
being taken against him or her," then the rights guaranteed under section
703(a) would be without substance.' Therefore, section 704(a) provides the
complainant guaranteed protection against such a result. The EEOC desires
such protection because "the filing of charges or complaints of discrimina-
tion and the information or assistance provided by witnesses and others in
connection with an investigation" enables the EEOC to perform its duty of
administering and enforcing Title VII.l " The EEOC believes that allowing
retaliatory conduct would produce a "chilling effect upon the willingness of
individuals to speak out against employment discrimination.""' 5 Although
section 704(a) protects individuals who oppose employment discrimination
or participate in the Title VII process, the EEOC makes it clear that it is not
meant to protect a protestor of employment discrimination from his or her
employer's reasonable and nondiscriminatory disciplinary actions." 16
c. Prima facie requirements of a retaliation claim
Historically, to establish a prima facie case of retaliation, a complain-
ing party must have shown the following: (1) he or she has engaged in pro-
tected activity; (2) he or she has suffered discrimination by the respondent;
and (3) a causal connection between the participation in the protected activi-
106. 545 F.2d 222 (1st Cir. 1976).
107. Id. at 230.
108. Id.
109. 463 F.2d 337 (8th Cir. 1972).
110. Id. at 341.
111. 2 EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL § 614, at 1 (1991).
112. Id.
113. Id. at 6.
114. Id. at 7.
115. Id.
116. Id.
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ty and the adverse employment action exists." 7 If the plaintiff successfully
establishes a prima facie case, the burdens of proof are allocated in the same
manner as in employment discrimination cases."8
Courts and the EEOC have failed to make consistent findings with re-
spect to each element of the anti-retaliation provision, and as a result, the
parameters of the elements have remained blurred." 9 Particularly, the
second prong of the test, requiring the complainant to suffer discrimination
by the respondent, has generated the most controversy because no definition
of "discrimination" is provided in the statute. 120 Courts have disagreed on
which types of employer action are prohibited by the anti-retaliation provi-
sion and have struggled to determine the seriousness necessary to constitute
adverse employment action.'21
B. A Split Among the Circuits
1. Narrow Interpretation: Ultimate Employment Decision Circuits
The Fifth and Eighth Circuits have employed a narrow interpretation of
the term "adverse employment action," requiring that the action reach the
level of "ultimate employment decision" to support a retaliation claim. 22
These circuits have held that acts such as hiring, promoting, compensating,
and granting leave constitute ultimate employment decisions.'23 The Fifth
Circuit has stated that "Title VII was designed to address ultimate employ-
ment decisions, not to address every decision made by employers that argu-
ably might have some tangential effect upon those ultimate decisions.' 24
In Mattern v. Eastman Kodak Co., 25 the Fifth Circuit held that the
events about which the plaintiff complained, including "[h]ostility from
fellow employees, having tools stolen, and resulting anxiety, without more,
117. 2 EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL § 614, at 8-9 (1991). In order to conclude that the
employer has discriminated against the complainant, the complainant must show that he or
she "was in some manner subjected to adverse treatment by the respondent because of the
protest or opposition." Id. at 9.
118. R. Bales, A New Standard for Title VII Opposition Cases: Fitting the Personnel
Manager Double Standard into a Cognizable Framework, 35 S. TEx. L. REv. 95, 99 (1994);
see also Richardson v. N.Y. State Dep't of Corr. Serv., 180 F.3d 426, 443 (2d Cir. 1999)
(stating that retaliation claims are evaluated under the burden-shifting rules set forth in
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green).
119. Spurlock, supra note 100, at 465.
120. 2 LARSON, supra note 92, § 34.04[2], at 34-47.
121. Williams & Rhodes, supra note 4, at 60.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. (citing Dollis v. Rubin, 77 F.3d 777, 781-82 (5th Cir. 1995)).
125. 104 F.3d 702 (5th Cir. 1997), overruled by Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. v. White,
126 S. Ct. 2405 (2006).
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[did] not constitute ultimate employment decisions," and therefore did not
meet the requirement of adverse employment actions.1 26 The Fifth Circuit
relied on the long-held rule that Title VII's anti-retaliation provision ex-
cludes reference to "interlocutory or mediate" decisions, which can lead to
an ultimate decision and, therefore, applies only to employer actions consti-
tuting an ultimate employment decision. 1
27
In Manning v. Metropolitan Life Insurance,128 the Eighth Circuit re-
jected as insufficient plaintiffs' claims that hostility and personal animus
directed toward them by their supervisors collectively established adverse
employment action. 29 The court cited its decision in Montandon v. Farm-
land Industries, Inc.,3' holding that "not everything that makes an employee
unhappy is an actionable adverse action."'' The court concluded that the
employees did not provide evidence of a "tangible change in duties or work-
ing conditions that constituted a material employment disadvantage," and
therefore did not establish retaliation in violation of Title VII.132
These cases demonstrate the restrictiveness of the Fifth and Eighth Cir-
cuits' approach to determining whether an adverse employment action sup-
ports an unlawful retaliation claim. ' These circuits have limited adverse
actions that will support a retaliation claim to those actions that reflect an
ultimate employment decision. 34 As a result of the standard developed in
these circuits, the decisions have reflected the difficulty of proving actiona-
ble retaliatory conduct.'
2. Intermediate Approach: Term, Condition, or Benefit of Employ-
ment Circuits
Some circuits have not restricted themselves to "ultimate employment
actions" in defining adverse employment action but have, instead, insisted
upon a close relationship between the employer's retaliatory action and em-
ployment. The Second, Third, Fourth, and Sixth Circuits have required
plaintiffs asserting a retaliation claim to produce evidence that the adverse
126. Id. at 707.
127. Id. at 708.
128. 127 F.3d 686 (8th Cir. 1997).
129. Id. at 692.
130. 116 F.3d 355, 359 (8th Cir. 1997).
131. Manning, 127 F.3d at 692.
132. Id.
133. Williams & Rhodes, supra note 4, at 60.
134. Id.
135. See, e.g., Mattern, 104 F.3d 702 (5th Cir. 1997); e.g., Manning, 127 F.3d 686 (8th
Cir. 1997).
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employment action affected "the terms, conditions, or benefits" of employ-
ment. '36
In Garber v. New York City Police Department,137 the plaintiff, em-
ployed in a civilian capacity with the New York Police Department
(NYPD), wrote "approximately 700 letters of complaint to police officials
and the mayor.' ' 38 In February 1995, the plaintiffs involuntary transfer to
another section of the NYPD did not adversely affect his employment bene-
fits or status in any way. 139 Nevertheless, plaintiff filed a complaint against
the NYPD for retaliation in violation of Title VII.14° The Second Circuit
cited its decision in Torres v. Pisano,14 ' holding that the plaintiffs transfer
"must constitute a materially adverse change in the terms and conditions of
employment."' 42 Absent evidence that the transfer threatened his salary or
benefits, the plaintiff's transfer did not constitute a materially adverse
change in the terms and conditions of his employment. 143
In Robinson v. Pittsburgh,'" the Third Circuit held that the plaintiffs
allegations of "unsubstantiated oral reprimands" and "unnecessary derogato-
ry comments" did not constitute adverse employment action as required for
a successful retaliation claim. 145 The Third Circuit held that the "adverse
employment action" element of a plaintiff's prima facie case of retaliation
must rise to the same level as that of a 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) or (2) vi-
olation.4 6 Retaliatory conduct falling short of discharge or refusal to rehire
must alter the employee's "compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment;" deny the employee employment opportunities; or adversely
affect the employee's employment status. 147
In Von Gunten v. Maryland,148 the Fourth Circuit rejected all of an em-
ployee's claims that her employer's conduct constituted an adverse em-
ployment action. 49 The court held that withdrawing use of a state vehicle,
"downgrading" plaintiff's year-end performance evaluation, reassigning
plaintiff to shoreline survey work, "improper[ly] treat[ing] of various ad-
ministrative matters," and "retaliatory[ly] harass[ing] creating a hostile work
136. Von Gunten v. Maryland, 243 F.3d 858, 865 (4th Cir. 2001).
137. 159 F.3d 1346, *1 (2d Cir. 1998) (unpublished decision).
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id. at *2.
141. 116 F.3d 625, 640 (2d Cir. 1997).
142. Garber, 159 F.3d at *3.
143. Id. at *4.
144. 120 F.3d 1286 (3d Cir. 1997).
145. Id. at 1300.
146. Id. at 1300-01.
147. Id. at 1300.
148. 243 F.3d 858 (4th Cir. 2001).
149. Id. at 861.
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environment" did not adversely affect the terms, conditions, or benefits of
her employment.15 The court stated that requiring plaintiffs to offer evi-
dence of acts that adversely affected the terms, conditions, or benefits of
their employment accurately reflected Congress's intended requisite for a
section 2000e-3 retaliation claim. 151
In Hollins v. Atlantic Co.,152 an African-American employee sued her
employer for disparate treatment on the basis of race because of her em-
ployer's application of its personal grooming standards to her hairstyle pre-
ferences, and for unlawful retaliation. 5 3 The Sixth Circuit concluded that
threats of discharge and lowered performance ratings were not enough evi-
dence to support a claim for retaliation under Title VII.' 54 The Sixth Circuit
supported its decision by citing the Seventh Circuit's holding in Crady v.
Liberty National Bank & Trust Co. of Indiana,'55 which stated that "a mate-
rially adverse change might be indicated by a termination of employment,
[a] demotion evidenced by a decrease in wage or salary, a less distinguished
title, a material loss of benefits, significantly diminished material responsi-
bilities, or other indices that might be unique to a particular situation."'
15 6
Because Hollins could not produce evidence that the lowered performance
ratings affected her wages, the Sixth Circuit could not conclude that there
had been a materially adverse employment action.
57
These cases reflect the Second, Third, Fourth, and Sixth Circuits' con-
clusions that the actions complained of met the same standard applied to a
substantive discrimination offense, by holding that only actions having an
"adverse effect on the 'terms, conditions, or benefits' of employment" will
qualify as retaliation.'58 The standard applied by these circuits does not limit
plaintiffs' successful retaliation claims to those adverse actions related to an
"ultimate employment action[,]" but it does not accept plaintiffs' retaliation
claims that do not allege conduct that materially affects a term, condition, or
benefit of employment.'59
150. Id. at 867.
151. Id. at 866.
152. 188 F.3d 652 (6th Cir. 1999).
153. Id. at 655-56.
154. Id. at 662.
155. 993 F.2d 132, 136 (7th Cir. 1993).
156. Hollins, 188 F.3d at 662.
157. Id.
158. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Co. v. White, 126 S. Ct. at 2405, 2410 (2006) (quoting
Von Gunten v. Maryland, 243 F.3d 858, 866 (4th Cir. 2001)).
159. Williams & Rhodes, supra note 4, at 60.
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3. Broad Interpretation: Actions Falling Short of the Ultimate Em-
ployment Decision and Term, Condition, or Benefit of Employ-
ment Standards
The remaining circuits have not found it necessary to so narrowly de-
fine the adverse employment action requirement of Title VII's anti-
retaliation provision.160 They have all rejected the "ultimate employment
decision" standard applied by the Fifth and Eighth Circuits and have also
accepted as sufficient actions falling short of adversely affecting "the terms,
conditions, or benefits" of employment standard followed by the Second,
Third, Fourth, and Sixth Circuits.'
61
In Wyatt v. City of Boston,62 a teacher in the Boston public school sys-
tem filed a complaint against the Boston School Committee and school per-
sonnel for retaliating against him for opposing what he viewed as sexual
harassment. 63 The First Circuit vacated and remanded a dismissal of the
retaliation complaint because, as the court explained, in addition to dis-
charges, other adverse actions, such as demotions, unjustifiable negative job
evaluations, and harassment by other employees, sufficiently satisfied the
adverse action requirements of § 2000e-3(a) for a retaliation claim. 64
The Seventh Circuit, in Knox v. Indiana,165 held that evidence of fellow
employee harassment and vicious gossip supported the plaintiffs claim of
retaliation. 66 The court explained that "[n]o one would question the retalia-
tory effect of many actions that put the complainant in a more unfriendly
working environment," and thus, there was no indication why an employer
permitting a complainant's co-workers to harass her does not fall within the
statute. 1
67
Ray v. Henderson168 provided the Ninth Circuit with its first opportuni-
ty to articulate a rule defining an adverse employment action, and the court
determined that it would follow those circuits that had defined adverse em-
ployment action broadly. 69 The court stated that "an action is cognizable as
an adverse employment action if it is reasonably likely to deter employees
from engaging in protected activity."' 70 The court held that the actions that
the plaintiff complained of, including reduced pay, decreased amount of
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. 35 F.3d 13 (IstCir. 1994).
163. Id. at 14.
164. Id. at 15-16.
165. 93 F.3d 1327 (7th Cir. 1996).
166. Id. at 1335.
167. Id. at 1334.
168. 217 F.3d 1234 (9th Cir. 2000).
169. Id. at 1240.
170. Id. at 1243.
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time to complete work, and decreased ability to influence policy, constituted
adverse employment actions because such actions were reasonably likely to
deter the plaintiff and others from complaining about workplace discrimina-
tion."
In Taylor v. Board of County Commissioners,'7 2 the Tenth Circuit held
that reprimands, slanders, and a transfer to a job the plaintiff "could not
physically perform and was not qualified for" were sufficient acts to support
a claim of adverse action. 7 The court followed the Tenth Circuit's ap-
proach in defining adverse action liberally to remain consistent with Title
VII's purpose and held that the court "takes a case-by-case approach to de-
termining whether a given employment action is adverse."'74
In Wideman v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,' the Eleventh Circuit explicitly
rejected the Fifth and Eighth Circuits' requirements of ultimate employment
decisions and held that adverse employment actions include those actions
falling short of ultimate employment decisions. 76 The plaintiff alleged that
she began experiencing adverse employment actions following her EEOC
charge against Wal-Mart.'77 The plaintiff complained of written reprimands,
inaccurate attendance listings, a one-day suspension, and an unnecessary
delay of authorization for medical treatment. 78 The court held that such evi-
dence, when considered collectively, satisfied the adverse employment ac-
tion requirement necessary to establish a prima facie retaliation claim. 
79
In Rochon v. Gonzales,8 ' the District of Columbia Circuit held that a
claim of retaliation will succeed if the plaintiff demonstrates that the "'em-
ployer's challenged action would have been material to a reasonable em-
ployee,"' meaning a reasonable employee might have been dissuaded from
making or supporting a discrimination charge. 8' Accordingly, a reasonable
FBI agent would be dissuaded from filing or supporting a discrimination
charge if he knew that such action would leave him and his family unpro-
tected by the FBI against potential harm.'82
These cases demonstrate that the circuits applying a liberal approach to
define adverse employment action have found actions sufficiently adverse to
171. Id. at 1244.
172. No. 05-CV-00372-WYD-BNB, 2006 WL 2092609 (D. Colo. July 27, 2006).
173. Id. at *3.
174. Id. (citing Jeffries v. Kansas, 147 F.3d 1220, 1232 (10th Cir. 1998)).
175. 141 F.3d 1453 (11th Cir. 1998).
176. Id. at 1456.
177. Id. at 1455.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 1456.
180. 438 F.3d 1211 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
181. Id. at 1219 (quoting Washington v. Il. Dep't of Revenue, 420 F.3d 658, 662 (7th
Cir. 2005)).
182. Id. at 1220.
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support a retaliation claim that would undoubtedly fall short of the conduct
required by "ultimate employment action" circuits and "term, condition[,] or
benefit of employment" circuits." 3 These circuits have liberally interpreted
the adverse action requirement to a retaliation claim in their decisions, and
as a result, a broad range of employer actions have satisfied the require-
ment.IS4
IV. REASONING
In Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. White, '5 the United
States Supreme Court affirmed the en banc Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals,
holding that Burlington Northern's thirty-seven-day suspension of White
and her reassignment from forklift operator to track laborer constituted ad-
verse employment actions in violation of Title VII. 116 The Supreme Court
held that the actions and harms forbidden by Title VII's anti-retaliation pro-
vision are not limited to those that are employment-related or those that oc-
cur at the workplace. 8 7 However, the Act prohibits only those employer
actions that a reasonable employee or job applicant would consider material-
ly adverse, meaning that the employer's actions would "dissuade a reasona-
ble worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination."'8 8
The Court began by acknowledging the split among the circuits regard-
ing whether application of Title VII's anti-retaliation provision is limited to
an employer's employment-related or workplace actions and regarding the
level of seriousness necessary for these actions to constitute retaliation. 89
The Court then analyzed the linguistic differences between Title VII's subs-
tantive anti-discrimination provision and the anti-retaliation provision, ulti-
mately determining that Congress intended that such differences have prac-
tical implications. 9 The Court next considered the standard it would adopt
in assessing how harmful an act of retaliatory discrimination must be in or-
der to fall within the anti-retaliation provision's scope.' 9' The Court con-
cluded its analysis by applying the standards it adopted to the facts of
White's retaliation claim.'92
183. Williams & Rhodes, supra note 4, at 60.
184. See generally id. at 60-61 (citing circuits employing the broad interpretation stan-
dard to the adverse action requirement of a plaintiffs retaliation claim).
185. 126 S. Ct. 2405 (2006).
186. Id. at 2416.
187. Id. at 2409.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 2410-11; see also infra Part IV.A.1.
190. Burlington Northern, 126 S. Ct. at 2411-12; see also infra Part 1V.A.2.
191. Burlington Northern, 126 S. Ct. at 2414-16; see also infra Part IV.A.3.
192. Burlington Northern, 126 S. Ct. at 2416-17; see also infra Part IV.A.4.
[Vol. 29
EMPLOYMENT LAW
Justice Alito's concurring opinion stated that the majority's interpreta-
tion of the anti-retaliation provision of Title VII had "no basis in the statuto-
ry language" and that the Court's standard would "lead to practical prob-
lems." '193 Justice Alito believed that Title VII's anti-retaliation provision
reaches only those discriminatory actions covered by Title VII's anti-
discrimination provision.1 94
A. Majority Opinion
In the opinion written by Justice Breyer, the Supreme Court held that
Title VII's anti-retaliation provision is not confined to employment-related
or workplace actions and that the provision contains a materiality require-
ment and an objective standard. 195 In reaching this decision, the Court
looked at the split among the circuits,196 the statutory language and its rela-
tionship to Congress's intent,' 97 the level of seriousness necessary before
actions become actionable retaliation, 98 and the objective standard for judg-
ing harm.' 99 Ultimately, the Court affirmed the Sixth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals's holding.200
1. Split Interpretations Among the Circuits
The Court began its analysis by acknowledging that most circuits ac-
cept the phrase "discriminate against" in Title VII's anti-retaliation provi-
sion as referring to "distinctions or differences in treatment that injure pro-
tected individuals."' ' The Court then focused on the circuits' failure to
adopt a homogeneous approach to whether an employer's action must be
employment or workplace related and what level of harm is necessary to
prove retaliation.20 2
The Supreme Court recognized that the Sixth Circuit required a close
nexus between the employer's retaliatory action and employment, and thus
applied the same standard for retaliation as applied to a substantive discrim-
ination offense under Title VII.2 °3 The Sixth Circuit adopted the approach
193. Burlington Northern, 126 S. Ct. at 2418 (Alito, J., concurring); see also infra Part
IV.B.
194. Burlington Northern, 126 S. Ct. at 2421 (Alito, J., concurring).
195. Id. at 2409 (majority opinion).
196. Id. at 2410-11.
197. Id. at 2411-12.
198. Id. at 2415.
199. Id.
200. Burlington Northern, 126 S. Ct. at 2418.
201. Id. at 2410.
202. Id.
203. Id.
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used by the Fourth Circuit, requiring that the employer's action must have
adversely affected the "terms, conditions, or benefits of employment."2'
The Supreme Court classified the Fifth and Eighth Circuits as "restrictive
circuits" because they adopted an "ultimate employment decision standard"
that confined prohibited retaliatory conduct to acts such as "hiring, granting
leave, discharging, promoting, and compensating. ' ,205 The Court next dis-
cussed the Seventh and District of Columbia Circuits' liberal approach that
required the employer's challenged action to have been material to a reason-
able employee, meaning it would likely have "dissuaded a reasonable work-
er from making or supporting a charge of discrimination. 2 6 Finally, the
Court addressed the Ninth Circuit's requirement that a plaintiff establish
"adverse treatment that is based on a retaliatory motive and is reasonably
likely to deter the charging party or others from engaging in protected ac-
tivity. '20 7 The Court granted certiorari to resolve the split in the circuits, and
therefore, had to decide whether the anti-retaliation provision extends
beyond employment or workplace-related harms and how harmful an act of
retaliation must be in order to constitute retaliatory discrimination. 8
2. The Statutory Language and Congressional Intent
The Court pointed out that the wording of the anti-discrimination pro-
vision differs from the anti-retaliation provision, and therefore, one provi-
sion should not be read contemporaneously with the other.20 9 The anti-
discrimination provision's language-"hire," "discharge," "compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment," "employment opportuni-
ties," and "status as an employee"-explicitly limits that provision's scope
to employment actions or actions that alter workplace conditions.2" Howev-
er, such limiting words and phrases are not found in the anti-retaliation pro-
vision, leading the Court to consider whether Congress intended such lin-
guistic differences to make a legal difference.21'
The Court reasoned that Congress purposely created differences in the
two provisions' languages because the provisions differ in purpose.2" 2 The
anti-discrimination provision's objective was to provide employees with a
204. Id. (citing Von Gunten v. Maryland, 243 F.3d 858, 866 (4th Cir. 2001)).
205. Id. (citing Mattem v. Eastman Kodak Co., 104 F.3d 702, 707 (5th Cir. 1997)).
206. Burlington Northern, 126 S. Ct. at 2410-11 (citing Washington v. I11. Dep't of Rev-
enue, 420 F.3d 658, 662 (7th Cir. 2005)).
207. Id. at 2411 (citing Ray v. Henderson, 217 F.3d 1234, 1242-43 (9th Cir. 2000)).
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 2411-12.
211. Id. at 2412.
212. Burlington Northern, 126 S. Ct. at 2412.
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workplace free of discrimination based on their "racial, ethnic, religious, or
gender-based status."2 3 The anti-retaliation provision sought to achieve a
discrimination-free workplace by prohibiting "an employer from interfering
(through retaliation) with an employee's efforts to secure or advance en-
forcement of the Act's basic guarantees."2"4 The Court concluded that Con-
gress's objective for the anti-retaliation provision could not be achieved if
employers' prohibited actions were limited to employment and the
workplace because retaliation may not relate directly to the employee's em-
ployment and may occur outside the workplace.2"'
The Court concluded that precedent and the EEOC's initial interpreta-
tions of the provision did not compel an interpretation contrary to its holding
that the anti-retaliation provision was not limited to discriminatory actions
that concern employment or the workplace.2"6 First, Burlington Industries,
Inc. v. Ellerth2 7 did not address Title VII's anti-retaliation provision when
the Court addressed the "Title VII requirement that violations involve 'tang-
ible, employment action[,]' such as 'hiring, firing, failing to promote, reas-
signment with significantly different responsibilities, or a decision causing a
significant change in benefits."'
2t 8
Second, according to the Court, the petitioner's and the Solicitor Gen-
eral's contention that the EEOC's interpretation compelled the Court to
reach a contrary conclusion was misplaced.2 9 The Court conceded that the
EEOC's 1991 and 1988 Compliance Manuals limited the anti-retaliation
provision to "adverse employment-related action."22 However, those ma-
nuals also suggested a broader interpretation for the provision by providing
that a "complainant must show 'that (s)he was in some manner subjected to
adverse treatment by the respondent because of the protest or opposi-
tion.' ' ' 22 The EEOC's 1998 Manual provided its only direct statement of the
activity prohibited by the anti-retaliation provision, stating that the anti-
retaliation provision is not limited to the same workplace-related activity
prohibited by the anti-discrimination provision.222
Finally, the Court did not consider it "anomalous" to interpret the anti-
retaliation provision to provide broader protection for retaliation victims
than victims of employment discrimination because such an interpretation
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 2413.
217. 524 U.S. 742 (1998).
218. Burlington Northern, 126 S. Ct. at 2413 (quoting Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 761).
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Id. (quoting EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL § 614.3(d), at 614-8 to 614-9 (1988)).
222. Id. at 2413-14 (citing 2 EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL § 8, at 8-13 (1998)).
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encourages employees to file complaints and act as witnesses in Title VII
actions.223
3. Seriousness of the Harm and the Objective Standard
The Court next focused on the seriousness of the harm necessary to
constitute actionable retaliation and adopted the standard applied by the
Seventh and the District of Columbia Circuits." 4 A plaintiff alleging retalia-
tion "must show that a reasonable employee would have found the chal-
lenged action materially adverse, 'which in this context means it well might
have dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of
discrimination."'225 Requiring a materially adverse action separates discri-
minatory conduct from trivial harms that all employees experience at
work.226 The Court adopted an objective standard because such a standard is
judicially administrable and "avoids the uncertainties and unfair discrepan-
cies that can plague a judicial effort to determine a plaintiff's unusual sub-
jective feelings." '227 The Court also noted that its legal standard was stated in
general terms because the significance of an act of retaliation depends on its
context.228 The Court concluded that its standard would separate trivial
harms from significant harms that are likely to dissuade a reasonable em-
ployee from making or supporting a discrimination complaint.229 Thus, the
Supreme Court affirmed the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, holding that a
jury could reasonably conclude that White's reassignment to track laborer
would have been materially adverse to a reasonable employee and that the
thirty-seven-day suspension without pay could have dissuaded an employee
from filing a complaint of discrimination and, therefore, was a materially
adverse action.23°
B. Justice Alito's Concurrence
Justice Alito wrote a concurring opinion in which he disagreed with the
majority's interpretation because he believed that such an interpretation had
no "basis in the statutory language" and would "lead to practical prob-
lems."23' In his view, Congress did not intend to burden the federal courts
223. Id.
224. Burlington Northern, 126 S. Ct. at 2415.
225. Id. (citing Rochon v. Gonzales, 438 F.3d 1222,1219 (D.C. Cir. 2006)).
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Id. at 2415-16 (citing Washington v. I11. Dep't of Revenue, 420 F.3d 658, 661 (7th
Cir. 2005)).
229. Id. at 2416.
230. Burlington Northern, 126 S. Ct. at 2417-18.
231. Id. at 2418 (Alito, J., concurring).
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with claims of trivial harms, and therefore, Justice Alito favored a harmo-
nious reading of sections 703(a) and 704(a).232 Under this reading, section
704(a) "discrimination" would encompass the same discriminatory acts cov-
ered under section 703(a), namely "compensation, terms, conditions, or pri-
vileges of employment.'
233
Justice Alito rejected the majority's argument that the materially ad-
verse standard was too narrow for two reasons. 3 ' First, there is a greater
probability that an employer wanting to retaliate against an employee for
making or supporting a charge of discrimination will do so at the
workplace.235 Second, the materially adverse standard is not restricted to
workplace retaliation. 236 Justice Alito concluded that the majority's interpre-
tation was not supported by the language of section 704(a) and, ultimately,
would allow employers' retaliatory conduct as long as such conduct "[was]
not so severe as to dissuade a reasonable employee from making or support-
ing a charge of discrimination. 237
In Justice Alito's view, the majority's standard would lead to practical
problems not intended by Congress.238 First, Justice Alito stated that "the
majority's interpretation logically implied that the degree of protection af-
forded to a victim of retaliation was inversely proportional to the severity of
the original act of discrimination that prompted the retaliation., 239 For ex-
ample, an employee enduring severe acts of discrimination would not easily
be dissuaded from filing a discrimination charge because the probability of
retaliation must be extremely high to outweigh the benefits of ending the
severe discriminatory acts.24° Second, the majority's objective standard of a
reasonable employee was unclear because the Court asserted that the sur-
rounding circumstances of a retaliatory action merit consideration.24" ' Final-
ly, the Court's test of whether a retaliatory act might dissuade a reasonable
employee from engaging in protected activity produced an ambiguous stan-
dard.242
Applying the materially adverse employment action standard, Justice
Alito would have affirmed the court of appeals's decision because White's
232. Id. at 2419.
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. Burlington Northern, 126 S. Ct. at 2420.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Id. at 2420-21.
240. Id. at 2421.
241. Id.
242. Burlington Northern, 126 S. Ct. at 2421.
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reassignment to track laborer and suspension without pay would have suffi-
ciently satisfied the materially adverse employment action test.
243
V. SIGNIFICANCE
Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. White has been called
"an important victory not only for White but also for employment discrimi-
nation plaintiffs nationwide.",2" Burlington Northern is important to the fed-
eral circuit courts because it finally resolves the split among them as to how
harmful an employer's prohibited action must be to constitute retaliation and
whether that action must be related to employment.245 Many commentators
believe the Supreme Court's decision will increase the number of retaliation
claims being filed and surviving summary judgment, but others believe the
decision's impact on corporate America will be minimal.246 This section will
explore Burlington Northern's significance by discussing all of these issues.
A. The Balance Has Shifted: An Employee-Favoring Standard
Retaliation claims constituted 29.5% of all charges filed with the
EEOC in 2005, and as a result, many federal appellate courts applied strict
standards in an effort to decrease the number of retaliation claims they were
forced to hear.247 However, the unanimous decision in Burlington Northern,
forbidding all employer retaliatory actions, even those actions unrelated to
employment or outside the workplace, "is a major victory for employees
from a court that historically has not been favorable to plaintiffs in employ-
ment discrimination cases. 2 4' By lowering the standard for plaintiffs alleg-
ing retaliation, the Court shifted the balancing test in favor of employees.
This shift will likely encourage more employees to file a retaliation claim,
and more retaliation claims should survive summary judgment.2 49 The
Court's statement that "context matters" should also persuade more em-
ployees to file retaliation claims because "'[a]ny time a court needs to weigh
factual issues, it is an invitation for employees or former employees to sue[]
243. Id. at2421-22.
244. Martha Neil, Supreme Court Sets Broad Retaliation Test: Employees Win Big; More
Claims Expected, ABA J. E-REPORT, June 23, 2006, available at WL 5 No. 25 ABAJEREP 1.
245. See generally Burlington Northern, 126 S. Ct. at 2410.
246. See infra Part V.
247. See generally Starr, supra note 3.
248. Barbara L. Jones, Employee Retaliation Claims Have More Teeth Now, ST. CHARLES
COUNTY Bus. REc., Aug. 9, 2006, available at 2006 WLNR 13920054 (quoting Minneapolis
attorney Marshall Tanick).
249. See generally Adler, supra note 2.
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because 'context' questions are factual and raise a matter for the jury.' 250
Burlington Northern should thus promote the purpose of the anti-retaliation
provision by protecting individuals who attempt to "secure or advance" Title
VII's basic guarantees and by punishing employers who retaliate against
those individuals. 1
B. Not All Is Lost for Employers
While the Burlington Northern standard is undoubtedly more beneficial
to employees than employers, the Court provided some protection to em-
ployers by requiring that an employer's actions be materially adverse under
an objective standard.2 The objective standard entitles an employer to ar-
gue that "no reasonable employee would have been dissuaded from filing a
charge because of the employer's alleged adverse action," and if the em-
ployer's argument is successful, the plaintiff will be unable to survive sum-
mary judgment 3.2 " The Court's "materially adverse" limitation will also dis-
suade plaintiffs who want to file a retaliation claim against an employer for
"petty slights or minor annoyances" '254 because such actions will not meet
the materiality requirement.255
C. The Practical Effects of the Court's Decision: Only Time Will Tell
As previously stated, the United States Supreme Court's decision in
Burlington Northern resolves a long-standing split among the federal cir-
cuits as to whether the challenged employer's action must be "employment
or workplace related and about how harmful that action [must] be to consti-
tute retaliation. 25 6 According to the Supreme Court, Congress intended Title
VII's anti-retaliation provision to protect those individuals opposing unlaw-
ful discrimination against retaliation from their employers or potential em-
ployers.25 7 To accomplish Congress's goal, it seems imperative that federal
courts uniformly interpret and apply the anti-retaliation provision. The
Court's decision in Burlington Northern should ensure that all federal courts
250. Jathan Janove, Retaliation Nation: A Recent United States Supreme Court Ruling
Will Stir up a New Wave of Retaliation Claims (Burlington Northern and Santa Fe Ry. Co. v.
White), HRMAGAZINE, Oct. 1, 2006, available at WL 10/1/06 HRMAG 62 (quoting Corbett
Gordon, senior counsel with Fisher & Phillips LLP in Portland, Or.).
251. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Co. v. White, 126 S. Ct. at 2405, 2412 (2006).
252. Id. at 2415.
253. Gary D. Friedman & Jonathan A. Shiffman, Burlington: Setting Standard to Cut out
Weak Retaliation Claims, 236 N.Y. L.J., Aug. 4, 2006, available at WL 8/4/2006 NYLF 4.
254. Burlington Northern, 126 S. Ct. at 2415.
255. Id.
256. Id. at2410.
257. Id. at 2412.
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interpret the scope of the anti-retaliation provision as extending beyond em-
ployment or workplace-related retaliatory harms and should require such
action to be materially adverse to a reasonable person.
Although uniformity in interpretation and application is desired, lower
courts will ultimately be responsible for interpreting and applying the Bur-
lington Northern decision to the cases before them.258 Historically, many
federal judges have been unfavorable to employment discrimination cases,
granting summary judgment before the cases reach a jury.259 Time will tell
whether Burlington Northern will actually make it easier for plaintiffs to
have their retaliation claims heard by a jury.
The Court's ruling broadens the definition of employer retaliation, and
many plaintiff-oriented employment lawyers are applauding the new stan-
dard. The potential aftereffects, however, may be more minimal than ex-
pected. Justice Alito, in his concurrence, suggested that most retaliatory
conduct does not occur beyond the workplace for fear of criminal prosecu-
tion.26° Because most retaliation occurs during employment hours, the
Court's decision to expand the definition of retaliation beyond the
workplace may not affect the majority of employers. However, the Burling-
ton Northern decision so heavily favors employees that the benefits of the
decision for employers are merely potential and possibly illusory, meaning
that employers will have to wait to find out whether the Supreme Court ac-
tually afforded them protection in its decision. In the meantime, Burlington
Northern should encourage employers to take prompt action to "document
and discipline employees" for underperforming or for misconduct because
the Burlington Northern decision has given employees a voice. 6'
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